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The main aim of this booklet is to exemplify standards for those teaching Cambridge International A Level History (9389), and to show how different levels of candidates’ performance (high, middle and low) relate to the subject’s curriculum and assessment objectives.

In this booklet candidate responses have been chosen to exemplify a range of answers. Each response is accompanied by a brief commentary explaining the strengths and weaknesses of the answers.

For ease of reference the following format for each component has been adopted:

- **Question**
- **Mark scheme**
- **Example candidate response**
- **Examiner comment**

Each question is followed by an extract of the mark scheme used by examiners. This, in turn, is followed by examples of marked candidate responses, each with an examiner comment on performance. Comments are given to indicate where and why marks were awarded, and how additional marks could have been obtained. In this way, it is possible to understand what candidates have done to gain their marks and what they still have to do to improve their marks.

This document illustrates the standard of candidate work for those parts of the assessment which help teachers assess what is required to achieve marks beyond what should be clear from the mark scheme. Some question types where the answer is clear from the mark scheme, such as short answers and multiple choice, have therefore been omitted.

Past papers, Examiner Reports and other teacher support materials are available on Teacher Support at [https://teachers.cie.org.uk](https://teachers.cie.org.uk)
Introduction

How to use this booklet

Question 3
3. (a) What was the Freedmen's Bureau?

Mark scheme
3 (a) What was the Freedmen's Bureau?

Level 0: No evidence submitted or response does not address the question.

Level 1: General answer

e.g. "This was an organisation set up to help people improve their..."

Level 2: Describe events

e.g. "The Freedmen's Bureau was established by Congress in 1865 to..." 250,000 African American children. However, the Bureau was dismantled in 1868 due to pressure from some members of Congress who opposed it."

Example candidate response – high

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>In the 1860s, the Freedmen's Bureau was formed. Its goals were to help...</td>
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</table>
| and minimise women's education. They provided people
| with education, which was very important for their future. They also provided former slaves with
| clothing, food, and medicine. The Freedmen's Bureau was... |
| to help African Americans and other minorities in need of help. |
| other minorities in need of help. |

Examiner comment – high

3 (a) The candidate shows a good understanding of the work of the Freedmen's Bureau after the end of the Civil War. They are able to describe how the Bureau provided economic help and that it was targeted at former slaves. To gain full marks, candidates should provide more specific information about the work of the Bureau or the length of time it was active. Mark awarded = 4 out of 5

Real exam paper questions

You can use these to create homework or create mock exams for your learners.

Mark scheme shows you the basis on which examiners award marks. It helps you understand the levels required and gives you break down of marks and possible example of answers given.

Use them as part of mock exams to ensure your marking is up to Cambridge standards!

Answers by real candidates in exam conditions. These show you the types of answers for each level.

Discuss and analyse the answers with your learners in the classroom to improve their skills.

Examiner comment indicates the overall quality of response (high, middle, low) and explains the strength and weaknesses of each answer. This helps you to interpret the standard of Cambridge exams and helps your learners to refine exam technique.
### Assessment at a glance

A Cambridge International A Level qualification in History can be achieved either as a staged assessment over different examination series or in one examination series.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advanced Subsidiary (AS) candidates take:</th>
<th>Duration</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Component 1  Document question</td>
<td>1 hour</td>
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<tr>
<td>Component 2  Outline study</td>
<td>1 hour 30 minutes</td>
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<th>Advanced Level candidates take:</th>
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<tr>
<td>Component 2  Outline study</td>
<td>1 hour 30 minutes</td>
<td>30%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Component 3  Interpretations question</td>
<td>1 hour</td>
<td>20%</td>
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and Component 4, one of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component 4, one of:</th>
<th>Duration</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Depth study 1: Europe of the Dictators, 1918–1941</td>
<td>1 hour 30 minutes</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depth study 2: The History of the USA, 1945–1990</td>
<td>1 hour 30 minutes</td>
<td>30%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Depth study 3: International History, 1945–1991</td>
<td>1 hour 30 minutes</td>
<td>30%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Depth study 4: African History, 1945–1991*</td>
<td>1 hour 30 minutes</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depth study 5: Southeast Asian History, 1945–1990s*</td>
<td>1 hour 30 minutes</td>
<td>30%</td>
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* only available in the November session

Teachers are reminded that the latest syllabus is available on our public website at [www.cie.org.uk](http://www.cie.org.uk) and Teacher Support at [https://teachers.cie.org.uk](https://teachers.cie.org.uk)
In Paper 3 the distinction between responses of a high level and upper middle level are significant. This distinction relates to a sharp qualitative difference in the marking criteria which we feel would be helpful to illustrate. As such in this section, some responses are organised into high, upper middle and low level. Others follow the usual pattern of high, middle and low level.

Question 1: The Causes and Impact of British Imperialism, c.1850-1939

1. Read the extract and then answer the question.

Faced with the prospect of foreign acquisitions of tropical territory hitherto opened to British merchants, the men in London resorted to one expedient after another to evade the need of formal expansion and still uphold British paramountcy in those regions. British policy makers in the late-Victorian, as in the mid-Victorian, period preferred informal means of extending imperial supremacy rather than direct rule. Throughout the two alleged periods the extension of British rule was a last resort - and it is this preference which has given rise to the many 'anti-expansionist' remarks made by Victorian ministers. What these much quoted expressions obscure is that in practice mid-Victorian as well as late-Victorian policy makers did not refuse to extend the protection of formal rule over British interests when informal methods had failed to give security. The fact that informal techniques were more often sufficient for this purpose in the circumstances of the mid-century, than in the later period when the foreign challenge to British supremacy intensified, should not be allowed to disguise the basic continuity of policy. Throughout, British governments worked to establish and maintain British paramountcy by whatever means best suited the circumstances of their diverse regions of interest. The aims of the mid-Victorians were no more anti-imperialist than those of their successors, though they were more often able to achieve them informally; and the late-Victorians were no more 'imperialist' than their predecessors, even though they were driven to annex territory more often. British policy followed the principle of extending control informally if possible and formally if necessary. To label the one method 'anti-imperialist' and the other 'imperialist' is to ignore the fact that, whatever the method, British interests were steadily safeguarded and extended. The usual summing up of the policy of the free trade empire as 'trade not rule' should read 'trade with informal control if possible; trade with rule when necessary'. This statement of the continuity of policy disposes of the over-simplified explanation of involuntary expansion inherent in the orthodox interpretation based on the discontinuity between the two periods.

Thus the mid-Victorian period now appears as an era of large-scale expansion, and the late-Victorian age does not seem to introduce any significant novelty into that process of expansion. The annexations of vast undeveloped territories, which have been taken as proof that this period alone was the great age of expansion, now pale in significance. That the area of direct imperial rule was extended is true, but is it the most important or characteristic development of expansion during this period? The simple historical fact that Africa was the last field of European penetration is not to say that it was the most important. It is our main contention that the process of expansion had reached its most valuable targets long before the exploitation of so peripheral and marginal a field as tropical Africa. Therefore, the historian who is seeking to find the deepest meaning of the expansion at the end of the nineteenth century should look not at the mere pegging out of claims in African jungles and bush, but at the successful exploitation of the empire, both formal and informal, which was then coming to fruition in India, in Latin America, in Canada and elsewhere. The main work of imperialism in the so-called expansionist era was in the more intensive development of areas already linked with the world economy, rather than in the extensive annexations of the remaining marginal regions of Africa.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the British Empire to explain your answer.  [40]
Mark scheme

1 What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the British Empire to explain your answer. [40]

Interpretation/Approach

The main interpretation is that there was a continuity of imperial policy through the 19th century, and that this policy consistently showed a preference for informal methods of control, rather than the formal acquisition of territory. Showing understanding of the Big Message will involve coverage of both these aspects. The extract argues that the increase in territorial acquisitions in the later part of the century actually obscures the real successes of imperial exploitation, which lay in places other than Africa.

This interpretation is in direct contrast to the traditional view which assumes a discontinuity in imperial policy between mid-Victorian indifference towards empire and the ‘new imperialism’ of the latter part of the 19th century, which saw the expansion of the formal empire.

Candidates might discuss the debate of whether imperialism was driven from Britain itself (the metropole) or by the men and women ‘on the spot’ (the periphery) – this extract is focused on the metropole.
Example candidate response – high

With focus on the Metropole ‘the men in London’

the extract argues that there was a basic continuity
of policy throughout the period of British Imperialism
1850–1939. In justification of this overarching
interpretation, the historian takes an unorthodox
approach analysing ‘informal’ as well as formal
Empire like Robinson and Gallagher. Further a critical
approach is adapted to oppose the theory of ‘New
Imperialism’ and discontinuity in Imperial policy.

The historian begins with the argument of informal Empire;
‘British policy makers preferred informal means of
extending Imperial policy’. This goes against traditional
analysis of Empire by its formal colonies. This approach
allows the historian to give a greater volume of
evidence on Empire most commonly explored by
Gallagher and Robinson. Similarly they argue that there
was an underlying continuity in Imperial policy and
this is contradicted from the study of informal Empire.
The ‘iceberg’ theory they created states the bulk of
Empire was ‘beneath the surface’ of informal.

The extract similarly in the extract the historian argues
that the period dubbed as ‘New Imperialism’ or the
‘era of large expansions’ is ‘pale in significance’ when
compared to informal acquisition.

The historian takes a critical approach arguing against
‘New Imperialism’, and the New Imperialism was
the period 1875–1939 where European countries rapidly
acquired formal colonies mainly characterised by the
‘Scramble for Africa’. The historian criticises the theory of
discontinuity as an ‘ever-simplified explanation’.
Rather it is argued "Government worked to maintain and establish British paramountcy". "Whatever the method, British interests were steadily most safeguarded and extended." This implies that the motive and policy of imperialists did not change easily the method. Next, "informal means of extending" were preferred, therefore the bulk of Empire is in the informal. Such as Egypt. Even when intervention was necessary due to the 1870's financial crisis, the British preferred to impose a "veiled protectorate" rather than formal acquisition to protect interests in the Suez Canal. "British rule was a last resort" as demonstrated in the case of Hong Kong. Britain had to formally annex it after 20 of its leaders resisted trade and banned opium.

Throughout the extract, the historian compares "mid Victorian" Imperialism to "late Victorian" Imperialism to display the continuity of Imperial policy. The theory of discontinuity distinguishes between mid and new Imperialism as "anti-imperialist" and "imperialist" respectively, however, this historian argues this is "over-simplified". British interests remained constant and were constantly 'safeguarded and extended'. Further, the historian argues against that the "expansive era" traditionally awarded to late Victorian Imperialism should be the mid-Victorian Imperialism where the "more intensive development of areas linked with world economy" was done, and therefore should be the mid-Victorian period where "most valuable targets" had already been exploited.
Example candidate response – high, continued

In conclusion, the extract argues that “was not only made up of it formal ports but informal spheres of influence as well and impact the ‘Informal’ was ‘more valuable’ than the formal. Further this is to support the overall interpretation that there was continuity in imperial policy. This goes against the orthodox Henry & discontinuity that distinguished between mid-Victorian imperialism and late Victorian imperialism. Rather it is suggested ‘British Interests were steadily safeguarded’

Examiner comment – high

The factor that determines whether or not a candidate achieves a high level on this paper is the ability to demonstrate a complete understanding of the interpretation advanced in the extract (as opposed to a sound understanding or understanding of aspects). In the first two paragraphs of this answer there are clear indications of complete understanding. First, the continuity of imperial policy, and second, the preference for informal rather than formal empire are both identified. The ability to focus upon and synthesise the essential aspects of the interpretation, and to state these as an introduction, is the most effective way of starting an answer. The rest of the answer can then explain the interpretation, illustrating and commenting upon its different aspects.

A particularly strong feature of this answer is the way in which it maintains a consistent focus on the extract. The question asks ‘What can you learn from this extract?’ which indicates that only material directly related to the extract can be regarded as relevant. This answer avoids the trap of writing about the topic rather than the extract, though background knowledge is still used effectively; for example, in showing awareness that this extract runs counter to traditional interpretations that have stressed the discontinuity of nineteenth-century imperial policy.

The sense that the candidate has firmly grasped the essential points of the interpretation is shown by the focus, relevance and brevity of the answer. There is no attempt to consider everything in the extract; rather, sections of the extract are quoted as needed to support points made about the interpretation. This evidence that top-quality answers do not have to be lengthy indicates that candidates would be well advised to spend at least 15 minutes at the start of the examination reading and thinking about the extract before they start to write.

The final quality in this answer that indicates complete understanding is the consistency of the arguments and points made. Nothing is contradicted elsewhere in the answer, and the conclusion serves to reaffirm and summarise what the candidate has seen as the overall interpretation.

Mark awarded = 34 out of 40
Throughout the extract, the historian presents a predominantly economic interpretation of motives of the British Empire, largely through the revisionist interpretation of Gallagher and Robinson’s ‘Formal & Informal’ assessment of empire. The historian’s approach, including the assessment of colonial policy, case study examples, enables him to arrive at the conclusion that there existed a ‘basic continuity of policy’.

The historian’s overarching argument centres on the idea that trade, and more specifically, ‘free trade’, was the main motive of British officials in the metropole. The ‘men in London’, according to the historian, were most interested in ‘safeguarding’ and ‘extending’ British interests by ‘upholding British paramountcy’ informally and, ‘if necessary, formally’. The historian states British policy makers ‘preferred’ the ‘indirect, informal’ approach to empire. This is supported by the views of influential British figures such as Disraeli and Palmerston, as well as numerous powerful businessmen such as Golden, who (instituted) propagated this approach, seeing acquisition of empire as unnecessary and ‘a great cost’. Additionally, the argument put forward by the historian tells us British policy towards South Africa, though not directly controlling, involved ‘informal paramountcy’ as they controlled the ports and other trading routes, resulting in a dependency on these resources by the Boser population.

The historian furtherthis economic interpretation by challenging the ‘alleged’ orthodox interpretation of ‘New Imperialism’. The word ‘alleged’, suggests the historian’s disagreement with this interpretation, turning it into ‘obscure’ and ‘over-simplified’. This interpretation aligns with the idea of the ‘iceberg’ theory put forward by Gallagher and Robinson, thus showing the historian in this extract interprets imperial policy as one of free trade being constant...
Example candidate response – high, continued

factor. As stated in the second paragraph, the historian using the approach of top-down analysing, the imperial economic history which confirms trade with the ‘Formal Colonies’ was much less profitable than that of the ‘large-scale expansion’ of mid-Victorian era. Evidently, the British East African Company is infamous for never having paid dividends to investors.

The historian arranges at his economic interpretation also their analysis of British policy throughout the 1850s to 19 mid- to late Victorian periods, concluding that the British adopted the most convenient policy at the time. He argues informal techniques were more often sufficient for this purpose in the circumstances of the mid-century, and argues the changing European diplomatic climate and rise in foreign challenge to British supremacy therefore led to a necessary change in approach. The example of ‘gunboat diplomacy’ and ‘indirect rule’ predominant in the mid-century is evident as British naval supremacy over the seas allowed them to coerce nations to trade freely, while the one-third of India was controlled by princely states, shows that suggests the British prepared this policy, and it was most convenient due to the little challenge from European rivals. The historian however points to the increasing rivalry after the unification of Germany and Italy as well as the rapid industrialization of those nations, France and Russia, which would the uses to explain the changing approach. Evidently, the Berlin Conference (1884) symbolized the need for formal agreements to prevent conflicts between states. Nevertheless, as suggested by the historians comment that whatever the method, the main aim was to safeguard British interests, evident in the joint intense protection of British trading routes from the ‘two-power standard’ policy adopted by the British.
Finally, the historian strengthens his economic interpretation on the significance of pre-trade, using rhetoric as he questions whether mere extension of direct rule was really the ‘most important or characteristic development of expansion during this period’. He presents the interpretation that the ‘most valuable targets’ had been reached long before the exploitation of so-called ‘new’ Africa. Indeed, Africa being the least profitable territory, increases the reliability of this extract. The examples of India, Latin America, and Canada as well as China and Egypt, which contrast, is effective as it considers both formal and informal, strengthens the historian’s overarching argument. The fact that foreign investments increased by 147% with majority in informal territories, regions either agree and strengthens the new trend interpretation that there was continuity greater continuity than change, as there was a more extensive development of areas already linked with the world economy, rather than.

To conclude, one can see understands that the predominately economic interpretation serves to highlight the discrepancies of orthodox interpretations, by placing greater emphasis on the consistency of free-trade policy in empire.
Examiner comment – high

The first paragraph identifies one of the essential elements of the historian’s overall interpretation – that nineteenth-century imperial policy showed a basic continuity. So, to decide whether or not this candidate shows ‘complete’ understanding of the interpretation, the other essential element – that there was a preference for informal rather than formal control – must be identified and supported elsewhere in the answer. In the second paragraph, this aspect is indeed raised, though in the context of what is essentially a sub-message – that trade was the main motive for empire. By the end of this paragraph there is still some doubt as to whether this second aspect of the overall interpretation is integrated sufficiently with the first, and therefore could be seen as a single interpretation. The fourth paragraph again briefly identifies the issue of the preference for informal empire, but does not discuss this as a central aspect. The final paragraph before the conclusion again focuses mainly on the sub-message of economics/trade, but the candidate does return to the aspect of continuity at the end. The conclusion itself does not totally clarify exactly what the candidate thinks the elements of the ‘predominantly economic’ interpretation actually are.

This answer is therefore a good example of scripts that find themselves close to the high level/middle level borderline. It demonstrates awareness of the essential aspects of the interpretation, but suggests rather than clearly demonstrates complete understanding. What helps this answer reach the upper middle level is its awareness of the interpretation being revisionist, in that it rejects both the traditional view of discontinuity in nineteenth-century imperial policy and the significance of ‘new imperialism’, and asserts the paramount importance of the maintenance of British interests by whatever means. Understanding this demonstrates how an overall interpretation can be developed from the extract.

Mark awarded = 33 out of 40
This historian does not vary much from the more modern understanding of Empire and imperialism. Though this is the case there are two interesting anomalies that can be seen in their extract. These anomalies can help lead to an understanding of this historian's approach and interpretation of empire and imperialism. The first of these is that throughout the extract the historian makes no effort to explain why imperial expansion occurred only that it did. Secondly the historian, in their only break from modern views, is that imperial policy was in fact relatively continuous. The following essay seeks to learn from the given extract how well it fits as an accurate understanding of the empire and imperial policy.

The blatant lack of explanation for the reasons behind the rise in imperial expansionism, can be seen as the one major failing of the extract. As it denies the reader many chances to gain deeper understanding into the authors biases and interpretations of historical situations. The historian gives us a brief chance to see into his interpretations, when he mentions that, 'the fact that informal techniques were more often sufficient for this purpose in the circumstances of the mid-century, than in the later period when the foreign challenge to British supremacy intensified should not disguise the basic continuity of policy.' This tells us that the historians understanding of why imperial expansion occurred in the late nineteenth century occurred was because of the increase in the imperialist activities of other powers, the historian does not directly state European powers but they were the main culprates in this rise of imperial activity. This is not particularly surprising, as most historical evidence suggests that the reason for the 'Scramble for Africa' as well as the explosion of imperial activity across the world was the settling down of the European nations after the unification of Germany. As such can be seen from this the historians interpretations are not anything particularly new. But this still gives no evidence for their approach to the historical understanding for the reasons behind empire. As such a different tactic must be taken to understand the historian.

It can be seen from the historians extract that the historian has little faith in the pushing power of settlers at the periphery on imperial policy. This is shown in a number of ways. For a start, the historians minor obsession with the 'anti-expansionist' remarks of a number of late Victorian ministers and their statement that, 'British interests were steadily safeguarded and extended.' These give the impression that imperial policy and expansion was a very controlled thing, debated in parliament between rival parties and eventually acted upon through the colonial office. This was not the case, for the simple reason that due to the technological advancement of the late
nineteenth century Victorians, communication between the metropole and the colonies was a labourious process and by the time a parliamentary decision was reached and passed onto the settler population, the situation on the ground would have totally changed. As such parliament left many of the decisions of imperial expansion to 'the man on the spot' who was able to react and adapt to local situations better giving Britain greater chances of retaining the empire. The historian fails to account for these factors in pushing imperial policy. Though this is the case the historian manages to maintain a relatively accurate and interesting narrative.

Their belief that the British government, 'worked to establish British paramountcy by whatever means best suited the circumstances' is quite accurate in describing the changes in policy throughout the late nineteenth century. Though it was the case that British imperial policy was adapted to fit the realities of most situations, the importance the historian puts on it is too high. This is because though Britain was fairly adaptable, it cannot be forgotten that parliamentary democracy was a major factor in the changes in British imperial behaviour. With the more traditionally imperialist Conservative party and the more 'anti-imperialist' Liberal party changing who controlled the government and thus the running of the empire every 4-10 years imperial policy went through dramatic shifts and changes in how it was expressed. The historian discounts that this was a major factor when they state, 'this[...] diposes of the the over simplified explination [...] based on discontinuity between the two periods.' It can be seen from the above, that the historian does not totally conform to the modern narrative of empire and imperialism.

From these points, one can see from the extract that the historian, though mostly following the orthodox accepted view of empire and imperial expansion does vary in some sections. It cannot be deduced from the evidence the totality of the authors interpretations of empire. The author also does not clearly state how he reaches these conclusion, their approach. Though this is the case it can be understood that the historian is sufficiently moderate in their understanding of empire and seems to follow a mostly economic and political approach to the forces acting upon imperialism. As such we can conclude that the author is relatively recent and of the more revisionist school of thought, though they do vary slightly form the accepted view, and that they are of a more metropole heavy view.
Examiner comment – middle

The answer definitely works on the extract, and perceives it as including a historian’s interpretation. However, can the answer be perceived as having a ‘sound’ or ‘complete’ understanding of what that interpretation is? Clearly not: to show that would mean detecting, supporting and consistently arguing aspects of the historian’s overall interpretation. The answer lacks the focus, precision and consistency to do that. Nevertheless it does understand aspects of the interpretation, which is the requirement for achieving a Level 3 mark.

The strength of the answer is that it identifies the continuity of imperial policy as an aspect of the interpretation. Though this is actually part of the overall interpretation, this answer does not see it as such, referring to the historian giving us ‘a brief chance to see into his interpretations’ (i.e. there is more than one of them). Indeed, the answer does deal with other perceived messages, such as the historian having ‘little faith in the pushing power of settlers at the periphery’, even though it is sometimes hard to discern these in the extract.

The answer shows a tendency to write about context, rather than focusing consistently on the extract. It fastens on a sentence in the extract – ‘the British government worked to establish British paramountcy by whatever means suited the circumstances’ – but instead of attempting to relate this to the interpretation, simply illustrates the sentence through contextual examples. This kind of unfocused use of context casts no light on what the question asks for, namely the interpretation and approach of the historian.

The candidate seems to believe that part of the task of answering the question is to evaluate the extract. This occurs first near the start of the answer where the historian is described as having made ‘no effort to explain why imperial expansion occurred’, and there are other instances of this throughout the answer. This is not necessary, and does not help to answer the question.

To sum up, this answer shows sufficient understanding of aspects of the interpretation to achieve a Level 3 mark, but also possesses characteristics would prevent the candidate from demonstrating ‘sound’ or ‘complete’ understanding.

Mark awarded = 20 out of 40
Question 2: The Holocaust

2 Read the extract and then answer the question.

I offered a portrayal of the Reserve Police Battalion 101 that was multi-layered. Different groups within the battalion behaved in different ways. The ‘eager killers’ – whose numbers increased over time – sought the opportunity to kill, and celebrated their murderous deeds. The smallest group within the battalion comprised the non-shooters. With the exception of Lieutenant Buchmann, they did not make principled objections against the regime and its murderous policies; they did not reproach their comrades. They took advantage of the policy within the battalion of exempting those who ‘didn’t feel up to it’, and those who said that they were too weak or that they had children.

The rest of the battalion, the largest group, did whatever they were asked to do, without ever taking the risk of confronting authority or appearing weak, but they did not volunteer for or celebrate the killing. Increasingly numbed and brutalised, they felt more pity for themselves, because of the ‘unpleasant’ work they had been assigned, than they did for their dehumanised victims. For the most part, they did not think what they were doing was wrong or immoral, because the killing was sanctioned by legitimate authority. Indeed, for the most part they did not try to think at all. As one policeman stated: ‘Truthfully, I must say that at the time we didn’t reflect about it at all. Only years later did any of us become truly conscious of what had happened then.’ Heavy drinking helped: ‘Most of the other men drank so much solely because of the many shootings of Jews, for such a life was quite intolerable when sober.’ That these policemen were ‘willing executioners’ does not mean that they wanted to be genocidal executioners.

In addition to a multi-layered portrayal of the battalion, I offered a multi-causal explanation of motivation. I noted the importance of conformity, peer pressure, and deference to authority, and I should have emphasised more explicitly the legitimising capacities of government. I also emphasised the mutually intensifying effects of war and racism, as the years of anti-Semitic propaganda dovetailed with the polarising effects of war. I argued that nothing helped the Nazis to wage a race war so much as the war itself, as the distinction between racially superior Germans and racially inferior Jews, central to Nazi ideology, could easily merge with the image of a beleaguered Germany surrounded by enemies. Ordinary Germans did not have to be of one mind with Hitler’s demonological view of the Jews to carry out genocide. A combination of situational and ideological factors that concurred about the enemy status and dehumanisation of the victims was sufficient to turn ‘ordinary men’ into ‘willing executioners’. The example of the group of men from Luxembourg in Reserve Police Battalion 101 offers the rare opportunity of comparing people in the same situation but of different cultural backgrounds. While the evidence is suggestive rather than conclusive, I noted that the 14Luxembourgers seem to have behaved very much like their German colleagues, implying that situational factors were very strong indeed.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Holocaust to explain your answer. [40]
2 What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Holocaust to explain your answer. [40]

Interpretation/Approach

The main interpretation is that the perpetrators of the Holocaust were, in the main, ‘ordinary men’, not motivated particularly by ideology, but rather finding themselves in situations brought about by war in which they were able to kill. Showing understanding of the Big Message will involve coverage of both the underlined aspects. Browning studied Police Battalion 101, as did Goldhagen, but this extract directly refutes Goldhagen’s conclusions. The extract focuses on the dehumanising effects of war, both on the perpetrators and on how they viewed their victims, in order to explain why the men of this police battalion were willing to carry out orders to commit mass murder.

Glossary: Although this extract has a particular focus on perpetrators, candidates may still use some/all of the following terms: Intentionalism – interpretations which assume that Hitler/the Nazis planned to exterminate the Jews from the start. Structuralism – interpretations which argue that it was the nature of the Nazi state that produced genocide. There was no coherent plan but the chaotic competition for Hitler’s approval between different elements of the leadership produced a situation in which genocide could occur. Functionalism is closely related to structuralism. It sees the Holocaust as an unplanned, ad hoc response to wartime developments in Eastern Europe, when Germany conquered areas with large Jewish populations. Candidates may also refer to synthesis interpretations, i.e. interpretations which show characteristics of more than one of the above. What counts is how appropriate the use of this kind of terminology is in relation to the extract, and how effectively the extract can be used to support it.
The author of this source first choses to look at Reserve battalion 101 as a way of trying to identify the "everyday German" as not just the Battalion but in the Nazi party as well. The minorities of the group were those who did not murder Jews, and those who did do this with pleasure. The author emphasizes that these 2 are the minorities in suggesting that twisted enough and those who "stood up to authority" were not the usual case within the 8th Reserve Battalion (which the author also hopes to generalise towards all Nazi and Germans). The majority were those who did as they were told. Those men who were at odds with the "unpleasantness" of their work and its apparent illegitimacy, and most of the killing was "we don't reflect about it at all". The last sentences of the second paragraph show to us the author's opinion on whether we could blame these men for being genocidal murderers. They call "willing" yet as the author continues he explains the course is often dispositional, rather than dispositional.

In the 3rd paragraph, the author gives several reasons as to why these people became the unwilling accomplices of the massacre. (see for conformity, peer pressure, fear of authority...) The author also goes on to provide a social background of the time. The "situation" that need influenced so many members of the battalion. Included the first that there is a
Paper 3 – Interpretations Question

Example candidate response – high, continued

wor... on... and the philosophies of the Nazi party. The author agree... very easily time... connected to form an image... than nothing Germany of A5 the Jews (who were the enemies) was contributing to the war. Here the author seems to be suggesting... part of downward pressure exerted by the party / government down on the bottom tier... whereas he/she also states that those who might’ve been... exerted pressure for the... massacres. (The "eager killer") were not the largest group... Thus... revealing the authors slightly slightly more intentionalist approach that he/ she & uses. The author stresses the fact that these "willful executions" were influenced heavily by Nazi ideology. Even if, the author admits, it does not equate to "Hitler’s demological view of the Jews". An interesting use of "carry out" is used here which again suggests that the orders came from above. It is entirely for the author to be an extreme intentionalist... he/she does not explicitly mention A5 or stress that Hitler had a dominant role in the matter... (Though anti-Semitic propaganda, Nazi ideology, the government’s capacity for legitimising... it was indeed mentioned.) The source also does not offer any dates that would help us distinguish better at what time period Adolf Hitler (or the Nazi party) made the decision of a massacre, whether in 1929... at the time of Mein Kampf... or as late as the Final Solution in 42. Therefore, not a positive intentionalist would probably be a good guess.
Example candidate response – high, continued

The author also goes on to mention the incident at Luxembourg as a way of comparing these men with their German counterparts, which again stresses the fact that "situational factors were very strong indeed." Since they behaved in a very similar way. The important fact here is that the Reserve Battalion (c) was made up also of volunteers from conquered states as well as German forces. Yet their actions agree with the statement that "ordinary Germans did not have to be of one mind with Hitler to carry out genocide." The fact that the author repeatedly stresses that the situational reasons were much larger than any individual personal reason (first, by stating that the majority was not those who killed for fun or out of spite, and secondly by saying the (d) Luxembourg case (in accordance to their German colleagues) serves to suggest that the author believed that "ordinary men" were under such influence because of the situation that were put in by the government. And to that in fact, if the government had not been in a war they had not adopted such anti-Semitic doctrines, then the ordinary people wouldn't have been prompted to commit such atrocities.

Therefore the conclusion should go as the author believed that many people (such as those of the Reserve Battalion) did not wish to carry out the heinous act, yet because of the situation that was created by the Nazis, many of them did do so.
Example candidate response – high, continued

anyways as a means of... or even to serve a twisted sense of duty. Thus it would be inferred that the author is moderate... rather than functionist in viewing the Nazi Party as none of the unfit.

Examiner comment – high

Despite the extract focusing on perpetrators, it was very common for candidates answering this question to attempt to twist their answers in order to address the issue of the causation of the Holocaust. The extent to which this deflected the candidate from identifying the main interpretation in the extract was an important factor in determining the mark an answer achieved. This response was not significantly compromised. Its conclusion that the historian was a moderate intentionalist (because the extract talks about the legitimising role of the Nazi government) is not irrational, and, in any case, forms only a minor aspect of the answer.

Unlike many answers, this essay understood the significance of the different groups within Police Battalion 101 identified by the historian. In the main, the men were not genocidal killers by inclination, but were turned into ‘willing executioners’ by situational factors. This was the historian’s overall interpretation, and the answer argues this consistently and with detailed support from the extract. With the exception of the marginal material on the causation of the Holocaust, the answer is focused and relevant throughout. The fact that the answer demonstrates ‘complete’ understanding is clear to see, and it was therefore awarded a Level 5 mark.

Mark awarded = 34 out of 40
2. When it is the question about how exactly did the Holocaust happen, historians can be usually divided into two groups: the intentionalists and the structuralists. The historian here, though not very extremely, favors the side of the intentionalists, who believe that the leadership from above — which is Hitler and his Nazis — was an essential driving force that pushed the Holocaust to happen.

The historian’s case

It has been many structuralists’ argument that there had been a background of general anti-Semitism idea rooted in Europe, but the historian here offers an opposite view that most German people who were involved in the actual killing were just following orders. “The largest group”, as he writes, “did not volunteer for or celebrate the killing”. It is clear that in the view of this historian, the general society did not have such a strong hatred towards the Jews as their leader seemed to have. They were doing the killing mostly because they did not want to “take the risk of confronting authority” or appearing to “appear weak”. It means they would put themselves in danger if they refused to execute the orders from above.

Additionally, some more reasons are given in the third paragraph, as they motivation of common Germans were “conformity, peer pressure, and deference to authority”. When every person in the society was forced to support the genocidal idea, it would be extremely hard for one to rise up and point out what they were doing was morally wrong. In fact, ordinary Germans seem to hate the idea of killing the Jews according to this historian, when he gives the example that the policeman had to drink a lot to get over with their the “many shootings of Jews”.

Then, since the Holocaust was not driven by the general hatred from the bottom of the entire society, the ideas and measures from the top became undoubtedly important. That is a point that many intentionalists like Daniel Goldhagen would focus on - the centrality of the Nazi ideology. The historian here, in addition to bringing out that, combines it with the importance of World War II, claiming that the war and the racism were interdependent on each other. "The Nazi first he points out that the war somehow "proved" their ideas that the Jews were "evil enemies who stabbed Germany in the back," as he mentions "the years of anti-Semitic propaganda dovetailed with the polarising effects of war." Then, he also explains that in a situation when a war was going on, it was even easier to make up the feelings of the difference between Germans and Jews, which were "superior" and "inferior" in Nazi ideology. The war helped the Nazis to make the Jews figure as an enemy to Germany ever more solid, and hence enables them to dehumanize the Jews and make the animosity legitimate, legitimate.

So to conclude, the summarise the arguments offered by this historian: First, there was not a general anti-Semitic feeling strong enough to make most ordinary Germans want to be involved in the genocide, so the main driving force that pushed the whole tragedy to happen came from the Nazis; Second, the Nazis successfully used the situation of the war to legitimize their criminal anti-Semitic aims and brutal policies. Even though the historian also makes some structuralist point like there were people with different thoughts and goals within the party group, and did not really emphasize Hitler's importance as one man, overall he agrees that the Nazi ideology was the key that led the Holocaust to happen, just as many intentionally would agree.
Examiner comment – high

This answer attempts to identify an interpretation of the causation of the Holocaust, which is not directly relevant, but moves quickly on to deal with the extract. The second paragraph the candidate shows they can identify and support an essential element of the interpretation. They state the historian’s view: that the men were not motivated by anti-Semitism, but were just following orders. The extract is then used to support this: for example, by quoting that their motivation was ‘conformity, peer pressure and deference to authority’. The third paragraph pursues the same approach with regards to the importance of the war, and again follows this with relevant support from the extract.

The conclusion is not as well developed as the preceding parts of the answer, thereby illustrating how important it is that the conclusion should be consistent with what has been written before it. The idea that the ‘main driving force’ for genocide came from the Nazis is not really the central idea of the interpretation (which is predominantly about the nature and motives of the perpetrators), and neither is the point about the Nazis using the situation of the war to legitimise their policies. If anything, these ideas are inferences/sub-messages: they are in the extract, but are not the main focus of the interpretation. In effect, the conclusion raises doubts about whether the candidate has ‘complete’ understanding.

Mark awarded = 32 out of 40
2. The historian “offers a multi-causal explanation of motivation”, suggesting that the Holocaust occurred due to the compliance of the German people involved - “the Reserve Police Battalion 101” - but they did not solely move at their own will as “killing was sanctioned by legitimate authority.” The historian appears to sympathise with the functionalist school in their interpretation of the Holocaust, almost a moderate stance, as they do not reject Hitler’s involvement.

The historian does not mention an order given from Hitler to set the project for Enrolling - the final solution - the ultimate order for complete annihilation which rules out any intentionalist view. The sole reference to Hitler in the text is the reference to “Hitler’s demonological view of the Jews” which is not exactly concealed by Hitler - except during the brief period of slowing down in Jewish activity in 1936 around the Olympics held in Germany which brought the world’s attention as Hitler stated his vehement dislike for Jews as early as in the 25-point program drawn up by Dr. Goebbels himself in 1920 in the early days of the NSDAP and in the late filled rhetoric in January 1939. What is significant in this extract is the lack of discussion of an ultimate order, despite the discussion of the intensifying effects of war and racism, and the blatant exclusion of that shows a slight biased disregard for an intentionalist viewpoint.

Although the historian claims that the war was vital to the killing of Jews, it is nothing helped the Nazis wage a race war so much as the war itself; the historian does not debate on the extent the typical debate on when the order was given or even specifying which war - even if the eastwards takeover or the operation Barbarossa were possible - but it is not clear. The war, probably relating to the advances in June 1941 into Russian territory, is not mentioned; showing a large emphasis placed on the individual battalion.
2. The historian’s approach can help explain the interpretation given in this extract— the examination of the ‘reserve police battalion 101’, a relatively obscure auxiliary force as opposed to the more commonly analysed Wehrmacht or the Einsatzgruppen sections—is a very personal interpretation. It is more of a psychoanalysis of the working of human nature in response to the situation as opposed to a bird’s eye view overall approach.

The assumptions that the members of the battalion had differing emotions—numb and dehumanised; being afraid of appearing weak—points those involved in an almost sympathetic light. The historian puts a large amount of emphasis on the fact the policemen were ‘willing executioners’ because of their fear to make principled objections against the regime and its murderous policies, which conveys that the writer claims that although a lot of the organisations—even within the battalion itself—behaved in different ways—acted on their own will (like the lack of unified Einsatzgruppen order to eradicate varying messages), there was still pressure from above. Although there are hints at Morawen’s typically functionalist polycentric model, this historian does not discuss the Nazi leaders specifically and any power struggle they have having, but rather a general dysfunction and disunity. The reference to the reluctance or not all-united will to be genocide perpetrators; especially when tied into matters of the war, later in the extract holds allusions to previous arguments that savage violence brought about by the fear of war does not equate to planned genocide.

Years of anti-Semitic propaganda and ‘racism’ and ‘conformity’ also reveal that the historian has examined the presence of existing German anti-Semitism stemming from institutionalised hate since medieval times amplified by distortions of Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution, the Goebbels and Streicher’s manipulation...
2. The deliberate intention to take advantage of the German people to impose their propaganda on effectiveness is hinted at by the mention of propaganda and Nazi ideology, but the specifics are not mentioned. However, the correlation between 'socially superior/inferior German/Jew' and a Germany surrounded by enemies is a hint at the popular German idea that Jews were equated with Communists, the enemy they were fighting in the East. The institutionalised racism in Nazi Germany is not referred to directly, and the historian shifts the blame as 'situational' by including *an anecdote* involving Luxembourg. What the historian is trying to imply is that anyone, not only Germans, were involved in the genocide whether they were 'of one mind' with the racial policies.

Due to the strong focus on human behaviour of thektionen, even including anecdotes about coping methods like heavy drinking, sources and factors that are already examined by other historians have been overlooked. One could argue that plans like Operation T-4 (euthanasia program, implemented in early 1940) was also due to 'conformity and peer pressure' and that it was the 'first chapter' of the genocide, but the historian does not include this. The historian also overlooks the possibly legitimately other battalions, but one could argue the Reserve Police Battalion can be seen as more or less an all-encompassing portrait of how the army/Wehrmacht and auxiliary forces behaved, but again, this is an assumption of the writer's intentions. There also have been no examination/slides of orders from within the Nazi hierarchy (e.g. Himmler's SS/SSs Ss brand, or Heydrich's SD).
Although the historian says that their explanation is "multi-causal", the historian does not refer to the possible compliance of the Jews themselves (like the willingness of the Jewish leaders in the General government Eastern territories to provide the Nazis with more lists like Arendt & Hilberg support) or the deliberate ignorance of the Allies despite the Requie telegram in August 1942 when the concentration camps were starting to be put in the full-scale destruction mode as planned in the Warsaw conference of January 1942, and the emigration plans for Jews (Mishmar Vor).

In conclusion, despite the fact the historian has chosen a very limited approach with the sources, this examination of the gross roots of the Nazi regime and machine of murder provides valuable insight we can learn from - they did not think what they were doing was wrong or immoral; and the "importance of conformity and peer pressure". This detailed analysis of the state of the human mind and why they were inclined to commit such atrocities on their own will reveals that the final solution, although not stated deliberately in an order, would have occurred from the large amounts of indoctrination to (propaganda and racism) and the ravaging of war (intensifying effects of war) allowing dehumanisation - showing an institution not directly from Hitler, leading to a fundamentalist interpretation.
Examiner comment – middle

The issue in marking this answer was to pick out those parts that dealt with the extract from among the irrelevant and unfocused material. This candidate was significantly deflected into a consideration of how the extract related to the causation of the Holocaust, and since the main interpretation was not about this the answer could not, by definition, demonstrate either ‘complete’ or ‘sound’ understanding. However, by consistently arguing that the extract was functionalist in nature, the answer was able to illustrate some valid aspects of the interpretation, especially relating to the war. This was enough to earn it a good Level 3 mark.

The second paragraph illustrates how the candidate was focused on Holocaust causation, and begins the process of supporting the conclusion that the historian must be a functionalist. In this and the following paragraph there are references from the extract to the war, but not to the nature or motivation of the perpetrators. Only in the fourth paragraph does the answer finally concentrate on the perpetrators, making some points from the extract. They did not draw out the importance of the different groups identified within the Battalion to the historian’s interpretation. The following paragraph then lapsed into writing about context, and lost sight of the perpetrators.

At this point the candidate demonstrates how attempting to evaluate the extract will always be damaging to an answer. The historian is accused of overlooking evidence and of omitting other elements of the Holocaust from their account, none of which has any relevance to what the historian is actually arguing in this interpretation. Candidates will never be in a position to make informed criticisms of historians, and the question does not seek such evaluation.

Nonetheless, the answer concludes by bringing together points which are valid and relevant about why perpetrators were able to commit such crimes, though even here the candidate asserts that the interpretation is functionalist in nature.

Mark awarded = 23 out of 40
Read the extract and then answer the question.

The Cold War had now begun. It was the product not of a decision but of a dilemma. Each side felt compelled to adopt policies which the other could not but regard as a threat to the principles of the peace. Each then felt compelled to undertake defensive measures. Thus the Russians saw no choice but to consolidate their security in Eastern Europe. The Americans, regarding Eastern Europe as the first step toward Western Europe, responded by asserting their interest in the zone the Russians deemed vital to their security. The Russians concluded that the West was resuming its old course of capitalist encirclement; that it was purposefully laying the foundation for anti-Soviet regimes in the area defined by the blood of centuries as crucial to Russian survival. Each side believed with passion that future international stability depended on the success of its own conception of world order. Each side, in pursuing its own clearly indicated and deeply cherished principles, was only confirming the fear of the other that it was bent on aggression.

So the machinery of suspicion and counter-suspicion, action and counteraction, was set in motion. But, given relations among traditional national states, there was still no reason, even with all the post-war jostling, why this should not have remained a manageable situation. What made it unmanageable, what caused the rapid escalation of the Cold War and in another two years completed the division of Europe, was a set of considerations which this account has thus far excluded.

Up to this point, the discussion has considered the split within the wartime coalition as if it were entirely the result of disagreements among national states. Assuming this framework, there was unquestionably a failure of communication between America and Russia, a misperception of signals and, as time went on, a mounting tendency to ascribe ominous motives to the other side. It seems hard, for example, to deny that American post-war policy created genuine difficulties for the Russians and even assumed a threatening aspect for them. But the fundamental explanation of the speed with which the Cold War escalated lies precisely in the fact that the Soviet Union was not a traditional national state. The Soviet Union was a phenomenon very different from America or Britain: it was a totalitarian state endowed with an all-explanatory, all-consuming ideology, committed to the infallibility of government and party, equating dissent with treason, and ruled by a dictator who, for all his quite extraordinary abilities, had his paranoid moments.

Stalin and his associates, whatever Roosevelt or Truman did or failed to do, were bound to regard the United States as the enemy, not because of this deed or that, but because of the fact that America was the leading capitalist power and thus, by Leninist belief, unappeakably hostile, driven by the logic of its system to oppose, encircle and destroy Soviet Russia. Nothing the United States could have done in 1944-45 would have abolished this mistrust, sanctified as it was by Marxist gospel. So long as the United States remained a capitalist democracy, no American policy, given Moscow's theology, could hope to win basic Soviet confidence, and every American action was poisoned from the source. So long as the Soviet Union remained a Marxist state, ideology compelled a steady expansion of Communist power.

*What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer.*
3 What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer.

Interpretation/Approach

The main interpretation is that, whilst both sides in the Cold War share the blame for the mutual suspicion which characterised relations after WW2, the reason why this suspicion escalated so rapidly into the Cold War is explained by the nature of the Soviet state. The interpretation thus has features both of the traditional and post-revisionist views (and might be seen as post-post-revisionist). Demonstrating understanding of the Big Message will involve discussion of both these aspects. The extract argues that Marxist ideology was what made the difference in that, whilst the US remained a democracy, the Soviets would inevitably see it as an enemy.

Glossary: Traditional/Orthodox interpretations of the Cold War were generally produced early after WW2. They blame the Soviet Union and Stalin’s expansionism for the Cold War. Revisionist historians challenged this view and shifted more of the focus onto the United States, generally through an economic approach which stressed the alleged aim of the US to establish its economic dominance over Europe. Post-revisionists moved towards a more balanced view in which elements of blame were attached to both sides. Since the opening of the Soviet archives post-1990, there has been a shift to attributing prime responsibility to Stalin – a post-post-revisionist stance which often seems very close to the traditional view. What counts is how appropriate the use of this kind of terminology is in relation to the extract, and how effectively the extract can be used to support it. In reality, even within each of the interpretations summarised above, there are great differences between the views of different historians.
Example candidate response – high

SECTION C: Topic 3

The Origins and Development of the Cold War

The source begins by putting forth the idea that the Cold War was not the fault of either the US or the Soviet Union, rather it was the inevitable consequence of conflicting ideologies. However, as the writer goes on it becomes apparent that in his/her point of view it was Soviet ideology that posed the greater problem, and thus Soviet ideology that was the main driving force behind the escalation and evaluation of the Cold War. The writer, while subtle in his/her attack, by the end of the extract has made it starkly clear that the United States was more or less helpless in the face of Soviet paranoia and Stalin’s “all consuming ideology.”

And thus, I believe that the writer is traditionalist in his approach towards the Cold War. In other words the writer considers the Soviet Union’s actions and/or beliefs chiefly responsible for the crisis.

The writer begins by talking about the machinery of ‘suspicion and counter suspicion, action and counter action’ that was set in motion following the Second World
Example candidate response – high, continued

War. A key element of this machinery, the reader is told, was its inevitability, given that each side felt compelled to adopt policies which the other could not but regard as a threat to the principles of the peace. Up until this point, the reader is under the impression that the writer holds neither the US nor the Soviet Union chiefly accountable for the cold war, in other words, the writer seems to have a be presenting a post-revisionist viewpoint that the cold war was circumstantial and inevitable. However, the writer’s true traditionalist perspectives soon become very clear apparent. It is made clear to the reader that when talking about the machinery of suspicion and counter-suspicion the writer is not in fact talking about the cold war, rather he is referring to ‘post-war jostling’. It seems that the writer views post-war jostling in the writer’s opinion this post-war jostling should have remained a manageable situation. The writer then segues into the main discussion of what actually made these conditions unmanageable and this is where his true approach is revealed.

Initially, the writer concedes to some post-revisionist interpretations of the cold war by stating that there was ‘unquestionably’ a failure of communication
between America and Russia and a mismeasurement of signals. However, the writer of these scenarios then insinuated that this framework was narrow as it excluded a ‘set of other considerations’. This indicates to the reader that the writer’s approach is divergent from post-revisionism. The fact that the approach is traditionalist in nature becomes clear when the writer states that the ‘fundamental explanation’ of the speed with which the cold war escalated lies precisely in the fact that the Soviet Union was not a traditional national state. The use of the phrase ‘fundamental explanation’ is very important here. It indicates that the writer is, for a moment leaving aside other considerations mentioned previously and treating these as the prime consideration. The writer goes on to attribute the escalation of the cold war to the inherent nature of the Soviet regime. The unflattering description of the Soviet regime serves to set itself up itself as an indictment of the Soviet Union by the historian. The Soviet Union is described as having an ‘anti-religious ideology’, being totalitarian and paranoid. While these statements may be correct, the fact that the historian is referring to the weaknesses of the Soviet government, and not the weaknesses of US government, of which
there were some, is again indicative of
the writer’s traditionalist approach.

Recovering the last paragraph further
strengthens the traditionalist view point.
The writer states that ‘whenever Roosevelt
or Truman did, Stalin was bound
to see the US as ‘the enemy’. In
saying this, the writer is again indulging
the Soviet Union while at the same
time implying that the United States
could not have done much to remedy
the situation. In other words, the Soviet
Union is portrayed as being responsible
as a consequence of its inherently
mistrustful ideology. The writer further
states that this mistrust was ‘Marxist
gospel’.

In saying that ‘no American
policy’ could hope won over Soviet
confidence, the writer is in fact absolving
the Soviet Union of blame by asserting
that whatever they could have done or
in fact did, would not remedy the
situation as Soviet ideology would
simply not accommodate for the United
States. The US is made out to be
the power that was perhaps willing to
compromise while the Soviet Union is
made out to be rigid, uncompromising
and driven solely by ideology. It is
because of those reasons that the
writer places the blame on the Soviet
Example candidate response – high, continued

Union. The last line serves as an indication that the writer did in fact view Soviet ideology as inherently expansionist. The Soviet Union remained a Marxist state, ideology compelled a steady expansion of power. The writer makes no similar reference to US ideology and where it too was expansionist or asserted on other states by the Americans. Thus the writer portrays the Soviet as ideologically driven aggression and the Americans as helpless of politicians and diplomats.

I believe that the writer has ignored several key points in his account particularly with regard to the role of the US in contributing to the development of and escalating the cold war.

The first point of note is that of Soviet paranoia. The writer claims Soviet paranoia was a leading cause of the cold war. However the writer seems to ignore that the US was just as if not more paranoid when it came to Soviet intentions. This was made clear in George Kennan’s Long Telegram published in February 1946. In this telegram it is pointed out that the Soviet Union will always be hostile to the United States, and is bent on world
domination.

Truman was quickly won over by the telegram. However, it is important to remember that at this point there was no solid evidence that the Soviet Union wanted to seize over all of Europe, or assert Soviet-style government. In fact, democratic government still continued in Hungary and democratic elections were held in Czechoslovakia in early 1946. It seems that the long telegram was then a consequence of US paranoia, not Soviet paranoia. The fact that paranoia existed in the US political elite became even clearer when Truman began sowing all those who did not buy into the idea that the Soviet Union was a hostile aggressor. For instance, Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace was sacked for speaking out against the US policy to get tough with the Soviet Union. Further examples of paranoia include the setting up of the passing of the National Security Act in 1947 at a time when war with the Soviet Union in Europe was not even considered a possible reality. The national security act greatly expanded America's war-making capacity and
Set up the CIA. It seems that America was jumping the gun and not the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, in reference to Soviet expansion, from 1945-1947, it seemed that the Soviet Union was pursuing mostly defensive policies on its periphery in an attempt to consolidate its borders after a dreadful war. While the writer refers to Soviet expansion and Soviet ideology, he makes no reference to American ideology. In many ways the US was also attempting to establish an informal sphere of influence in Europe through the Marshall Plan, the creation of a West German state in 1949 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of April 1949. The US was also attempting to export its ideology of 'Americanism' to Europe through the vast flow of US dollars to neutrals in the region.
Examiner comment – high

This script has an excellent introduction which immediately identifies the main elements of the historian’s interpretation. The candidate identified that the extract saw the Cold War as the fault of neither side. They concluded their opening by stating that the ideology of the Soviet Union meant there was nothing the USA could do to resolve the hostility between them and so allocating primary blame to the USSR. It summarises all this by concluding that the historian was a traditionalist, which is consistent with the extract, though it could be argued equally, that the historian must be a post-post-revisionist.

Having included the overall interpretation in the introduction, the answer moves on to illustrating it. In the next paragraph the candidate deals with the first aspect of the interpretation, showing how the historian sets up the eventual traditionalist conclusion by first considering how both sides were tied into ‘the machinery of suspicion and counter-suspicion’, and then into the competitive relationship normal between nation states, a situation that should have remained manageable. However, this is eventually turned on its head by the historian’s view that the ‘fundamental explanation’ for the escalation of the Cold War was the nature of the Soviet Union. The candidate meticulously charts and supports this argument from the extract.

What prevents this answer from achieving full marks is the lengthy lapse into evaluation and the unfocused content which comes at the end of the answer. None of this adds anything to answering the question ‘What can you learn from this extract?’ Although it does not undermine the judgement that the candidate has a ‘complete’ understanding of the interpretation, a higher mark within Level 5 would have been achieved without it.

Mark awarded = 37 out of 40
The historian in the given extract adopts the post-revisionist approach, which, to summarize the approach as well as the extract briefly means that he does not place the blame on either the USA or the USSR. Instead he states various reasons why the Cold War developed as a result of both nations' actions and the misunderstandings that erupted from those actions. The historian begins the extract right away by inducing the thought of conflict. There was a 'dilemma': A dilemma of both the US and USSR taking steps to ensure the best for their own countries and wordlessly accusing each other for going a step too far. These wordless accusations were actually made very clear through actions. The Yalta Conference (1945) was quite joyous as each power was struck by momentary happiness of winning the war soon, but just like the historian mentions, there was a dilemma. Tensions were already brewing under the surface as a decision on Poland could not be made. One of the promises made during this conference, however, was to give free and fair elections—something Stalin outrightly dismissed as he called
the shots later in the invasion of Poland and the setting up of a Communist Government. Everyone was wary of this, especially the Western world, having been gripped in fear of communism for so long. As the historian continues to say that both sides ‘felt compelled’ to undertake their own defense measures.

Since the Americans believed the Soviets were expanding, they decided to do so too. Russian expansion was extremely frightening to the West because they thought the more places Stalin occupied and turned communist then they were next in line for a possible communist take over.

The situation, however, took a heavy turn when both Roosevelt and Churchill were replaced with new leaders (President Harry Truman from the US). Roosevelt and Churchill were relatively more passive/tolerant when it came to communism though they may not have been as tolerant behind closed doors— as shown in Churchill in response to Stalin’s apparently “misquoted” extreme speech in 1946 stating that “the West could never be allies as it was...”
Example candidate response – middle, continued

a fight against each other regarding which school of thought would dominate. Churchill responded by stating that an iron curtain had descended over the East and West, separating them.

When Harry Truman came into the picture, he was very suspicious of Communism and definitely not as tolerant or understanding like Roosevelt was. To escalate tensions he had confided in Britain about the atomic bomb hitting Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the end of the war, and purposely left Russia out, which modern historians take as a sign from Truman warning Stalin of the damage he could do if he ever came after the West with his communism.

The historian believes that the state of misunderstanding between the two was now set in motion, especially after the US introduced the Truman doctrine which offered help to all countries in East who were being pressured by Stalin to turn communist. The Marshall plan was an extension
of this and provided the financial support for it to be carried out. Despite the high levels of tension though, the historian argues that there was no reason why this should not have remained a manageable situation. Suggesting that at some point in the late 1940’s there was still time to clear up misunderstandings.

The historian blames “the failure of communication between Russia and America” as one of the reasons for the situation getting more out of hand than it already was. This includes the many misinterpretations both sides made about each other, especially issues concerning expansion. Stalin’s apparent motive was to make ‘friendly relations’ with his surrounding neighbours to strengthen his own position but to America, no matter what, Stalin was expected spreading communism, and by force too.

At this point the historian outlines the main and most important cause of the development of the cold war. It was simply because the Soviet Union was communist. Communism, the idea that basically
wealthy populations in the west strongly disliked proved to be the major threat. It is actually worth questioning whether the Cold War would have developed at the rapid state that it did or if the Cold War would have even existed, if the Soviet Union was capitalist instead of Communist.

As mentioned before, the speech made by Stalin in 1946 claiming that the West and the East would never be friends due to the clash in ideology (one would have to defeat the other), further emphasizes the terror the Western powers were consumed with allowing them to further dwell in their panic and continuously regard the Soviet Union with a totally paranoid mindset.

The historian concludes the extract by going on to outline exactly how impossible relations between the East and West would remain so long as the clash in ideology continued. The development of the Cold War was a result of multiple misunderstandings and misconceptions.
Almost all answers on the Cold War use labels to identify the nature of interpretations – traditional, revisionist, etc. These labels are useful as shorthand, though not sufficient in themselves to earn much credit unless properly supported from the extract. It should also be stressed that perfectly good answers can be written about the extracts with no use of labels at all. Labels can also be dangerous – nothing betrays lack of understanding more than incorrect material used to exemplify a label. They can also be limiting, since, if used in a conclusion, they signify an overall judgement on the interpretation, regardless of what has been said elsewhere in the answer. This script is a good example of how labels work.

Right from the start the candidate states that the extract is post-revisionist. Unless the argument makes it very clear otherwise, this will always be taken as a statement that the historian blames both or neither side for the Cold War, as this answer states. It is true that the extract contains a lot of material that can support this conclusion – indeed this is one aspect of the overall interpretation. However, it also has some material that does not support it. By consistently arguing that the interpretation is post-revisionist the answer can only demonstrate understanding of part of the interpretation, but not all of it. This is regarded as showing ‘sound’ but not ‘complete’ understanding. Throughout the answer the extract is used to support this view: ‘the historian (says) that both sides felt compelled to undertake their own defence measures’; ‘the historian believes that the state of misunderstanding between the two was now set in motion’, and so on.

However, eventually the answer identifies the other aspect of the overall interpretation: ‘At this point, the historian outlines the main and most important cause … it was simply because the Soviet Union was communist’. Yet the candidate makes nothing of this; it is seen merely as an adjustment or a refinement of the post-revisionist interpretation. The conclusion makes the candidate’s post revisionist stance clear: ‘The development of the Cold War was a result of multiple misunderstandings’.

Thus, even though both elements of the overall interpretation are identified in the answer, they are viewed as elements of a post-revisionist interpretation. It is the label that removes any doubt and so this cannot be ‘complete’ understanding.

Mark awarded = 29 out of 40
3. Cold war was one of the most brutal. One where both America and the Soviet Union were trying to succeed from the other. The historians who wrote this approach were traditionalist one where Russia was blamed for the start of the cold war causing a clash of ideologies as well as methods. Where America favoured capitalism on the other hand Stalin and the Soviet Union were inclined to spread communism. In the first text the historian talks about how that the cold war has started. America had the notion that Russia was a dictatorship. Each side wanted to cripple the other for their policies had an clash.

Russians were regarded as fanatics by the Americans according to the NSC-68 document developed in 1949 during the time Harry Truman which stated that Russians were fanatics who would stop at nothing to spread communism in every nook of the world.
During the world war II in 1945 according to the lend lease program Roosevelt was inclined to trust Stalin sending war materials of every kind making it possible for Russia to play an active part.

The relations of Russia and America deteriorated in 1945 when the world war II was at the brink of ending and the three powers met Russia, America and Britain met at Yalta, Ukraine to decide what was to become of Germany after the war ended. At that time Russia had a monopoly controlling Poland from the eastern side, even though both Winston Churchill and Roosevelt were not happy at that time but they could not do anything regarding the fact that Russian land rium to develop modern ideas that it was possible to challenge the Red army which controlled Russia.

With the coming of Harry S Truman America's ideology completely changed since Harry Truman himself viewed Russia and especially Stalin with suspicious look.
Example candidate response – low, continued

the development of dropped atomic bomb on Russia, Japan making him Stalin realize what might happen if Russia crossed his limit and even thought about trying to develop a fight with USA.

During the Iron curtain speech made by Winston Churchill in Fulton, Missouri, stated that Germany was divided into four zones. While the west tried to modernise their zones, Russia felt that it was better if Stalin kept the Russian zone separate. The speech criticising Stalin that he was not taking whatever he needed from his zone causing Stalin to get angry due to which he captured Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia.

Even though capturing of these states created a great peril in the western states but this was not enough. America specially Harry S. Truman believed that if according to the Domino Theory if one country falls para pray to communism.
Example candidate response – low, continued

nearby one will also. Due to this
be game Turkey came an add of
no million to stop it from becoming
communist. They even introduced the
Marshall Law which would countries
that had been liberated from
go to Germany to be provided with economic
aid to help boost their economies
but this was not enough.
The Russian of Stalin was quite
different from the Russian before with
the development of communism the government
became more strong influenced by
the teachings of Karl Marx & Stalin
believed that everything in their Russia
was the property of the government
who had immense control over
every political or no political aspect of
Russia on.
On the other hand Britain and USA
were liberated allowing free elections
in their own countries as well as
the countries they had won were
allowed free elections and a government
of their choice.
The interests of both Soviet union
and USA had been in clashing
with each other Berlin as well as
was divided equally among the four
powers but Berlin belonging to the west was quite better than the one belonging to Russia. When the west zones of Berlin introduced a new currency Stalin felt it as a humiliation causing all roads between east Berlin and west zones of Berlin to be blocked. Stalin believed that starvation would cause the western powers to surrender but Harry S. Truman threw an aid of 20 million tons compromising of wheat and other products keeping west Berliners safe from Russia. Harry S. Truman also ordered B-29 bombers to be placed on British airfield in case they events take an bad turn.

According to the historians Stalin and Russian officials regarded Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman as anti-communists even though they had helped each other win the war with Germany. Every policy coined by the USA government, including Truman doctrine, as well as Marshall aid were not able to please Russia but caused a greater sense of hatred.
due to which Russia developed its own form of policy which mirrored those of NATO, including Comecon, which aimed to put strong control on Eastern Europe while Molotov played a role to provide aid to the satellite state also known as Eastern Europe.

The relationship even further deteriorated between these two countries when in 1949, Russia had made an atomic bomb of its own. They also developed NATO, known as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was joined by 16 other nations with every NATO officer & being an American due to which Russia developed the Warsaw Pact in 1955 mirroring that of NATO.

Even countries like Czechoslovakia even though contained less amount of communist control in government, where Klement Gottwald was their leader, who feared they were going to lose, picturing themselves on what Stalin had done in Russia caused them to murder President Beneš and to foreign minister Masaryk.
Example candidate response – low, continued

While President Burev tried in order to save his life amid yet another country using Karl Marx ideology and Stalin’s inspiration to develop into an communist state, only Yugoslavia was taken out of communism since their leader Marshall Tito did not conform well to the ideas of Stalin causing it to be excluded.

According to the Historian both countries having fierce extraordinary love for their country resented each other but it was considered that America’s policy helped several countries to rise up while Russia drained it’s zones of vital sources reducing the countries in his grasp to poverty since in a subtle way Stalin was the only dictator of East Eastern Europe where nobody had the right to stand in front of him and those who tried met their death in a brutal way but to Russia immense power and control caused no action to be taken against Russia as well as Stalin.
### Example candidate response – low, continued

At the start of the answer the candidate identifies the nature of the interpretation: it is traditionalist, with Russia blamed for the Cold War. This is a valid way of viewing the extract. Thereafter the answer is an essay on the Cold War. There is an occasional point that might be taken from the extract, but nothing of any consequence until the conclusion, which returns to the historian’s point of blaming Stalin.

The issue is whether this answer has demonstrated any understanding of aspects of the interpretation, since this is a requirement for a Level 3 Mark. The answer has identified one aspect of the overall interpretation, and only because of this was it awarded the minimum mark in Level 3.

Almost all of this answer consists of unfocused content. It is relevant to the topic, but has no bearing on answering the question, which requires analysis of the extract.

**Mark awarded = 18 out of 40**